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I. CAPITALISM TODAY 
The past year has seen the surprising ascent of French economist 
Thomas Piketty to "rock star" status. 1 The reading public's appetite 
for his economic treatise seems motivated by a growing unease about 
economic inequality and an anxiety that the "Great Recession," which 
followed the financial crisis of 2008, defines a new economic normal. 
The seemingly plutocratic response to the crisis has become the focus 
of angry attacks by protesters on both left and right, 2 but their criti-
cisms have had little practical effect, even while subsequent events 
have confirmed their fears. In 2oro, the United States Supreme Court 
sealed the union of corporate money and politics in Citizens United v. 
FEC,3 which subsequent judgments have further entrenched. 4 Mean-
while, the response to the crisis in Europe has suggested that Brussels 
now operates as an arm of finance capital and that monetary union is 
more likely to prove the undertaker of European social democracy 
than its savior. 5 
* Associate Professor, Yale Law School. The author thanks Ruth Abbey, Bruce Ackerman, 
Cliff Ando, Rick Brooks, Angus Burgin, Daniela Cammack, Paul Cammack, Stefan Eich, Owen 
Fiss, Bryan Garsten, Arthur Goldhammer, Jacob Hacker, Robert Hockett, Paul Kahn, Amy 
Kapczynski, Jeremy Kessler, Alvin Klevorick, Jonathan Macey, Daniel Markovits, Pratap Mehta, 
Robert Post, Jedediah Purdy, Sanjay Reddy, Roberta Romano, George Scialabba, Tim Shenk, 
Reva Siegel, Peter Spiegler, Adam Tooze, Richard Tuck, Patrick Weil, and John Witt for discus-
sions on these and related issues. He is also grateful for the advice and assistance of the editors of 
the Harvard Law Review and for the excellent research assistance of Cory Adkins. He owes spe-
cial thanks to Kate Harris, Daniel Herz-Roiphe, and Lev Menand, who read through Piketty's 
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1 Jennifer Schuessler, Economist Receives Rock Star Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. rg, 2or4, 
at Cr. 
2 For an inside account of the crisis and its management, see RON SUSKIND, CONFIDENCE 
MEN (2orr). 
3 r30 S. Ct. 876 (2oro). 
4 See McCutcheon v. FEC, r34 S. Ct. r434 (2or4); see also infra notes r r6-r9. 
5 See, e.g., Wolfgang Streeck, Markets and Peoples, NEW LEFT REV., Jan.-Feb. 2or2, at 6r; 
Susan Watkins, Vanity and Venality, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Aug. 29, 2or3, at r7. 
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Piketty first came to prominence with his collaborator Professor 
Emmanuel Saez during the mid-2ooos when they published several 
carefully researched studies of income inequality in the United States. 6 
Their finding that since the mid-197os the "one percent" in the United 
States had received an ever-growing share of the national income was 
seized on by academics and commentators - and later provided the 
basis for the political slogans of the Occupy movement. Piketty also 
published analyses of historical trends in income and wealth inequality 
across most developed countries, a project undertaken with several 
prominent international collaborators, including the distinguished Brit-
ish economist Professor Anthony Atkinson. 7 
Piketty's most recent volume, published in French in 2013, and in 
English in 2014 as Capital in the Twenty-First Century - a knowing 
nod to Karl Marx - is a sprawling, ambitious text that builds on this 
earlier work while rendering it accessible to a wider audience. 8 Its ar-
gument, backed by impressive empirical data, may be summed up in 
three words: capitalism generates inequality. This in some ways old-
fashioned claim has been received with great enthusiasm (and contro-
versy) in the United States and elsewhere and has managed the rare 
feat of generating widespread discussion in both popular and academic 
circles. It has garnered reviews, sometimes several, in every important 
newspaper; received detailed coverage from all major economics jour-
nalists and commentators; and been scrutinized by mainstream aca-
demic economists, such as Professors Robert Solow, Larry Summers, 
and Paul Krugman9 - who called it "the most important economics 
book of the year - and maybe of the decade"10 - as well as more 
6 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, I9IJ-I998, l 18 
Q. J. ECON. l (2003); Thomas Piketty & Emmaneul Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A His-
torical and International Perspective (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11955, 
2006). 
7 The data are collected and updated at The World Top Incomes Database website. See 
Facundo Alvaredo et al., THE WORLD TOP INCOMES DATABASE, http://topincomes 
.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) [http://perma.cc/QP7V-AFLG]. 
Academic papers include Facundo Alvaredo et al., The Top I Percent in International and Histor-
ical Perspective (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19075, 2013) [hereinafter 
Alvaredo et al., The Top I Percent]; Anthony B. Atkinson et al., Top Incomes in the Long Run of 
History (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15408, 2009); and Thomas Piketty, 
Top Income Shares in the Long Run: An Overview, 3 J. EUR. ECON. Ass'N 382 (2005). 
8 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2or4). For the original French edition, see THOMAS PIKETTY, LE CAPITAL AU XXIE 
SIECLE (2or3). 
9 See Paul Krugman, Why We're in a New Gilded Age, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 8, 2or4, at 
r5; Robert M. Solow, The Rich-Get-Richer Dynamic, NEW REPUBLIC, May r2, 2or4, at 50; 
Lawrence H. Summers, The Inequality Puzzle, DEMOCRACY, Spring 2or4, at gr. 
10 Paul Krugman, Wealth over Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2or4, at A1 r. 
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heterodox scholars, who have greeted the work with a mixture of re-
spect, disappointment, and relief.11 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century has thus prompted discussion 
of inequality, financial regulation, and political economy across an un-
usually wide spectrum, and for this alone the work deserves the praise 
it has received. Not every book can bring academic economists, busi-
nesspeople, students, central bankers, politicians, policymakers, and 
social activists into a conversation about the future of capitalism. Nor 
need one ask the last time a 700-page book written by a French social-
ist received a chapter-by-chapter reading in The Economist. 12 
This broad appeal is not only the result of fortuitous timing and a 
careful argument, however. It also reflects the fact that both the sub-
ject itself and Piketty's handling of it invite interdisciplinary interest. 13 
In what follows, I will bring that aspect to the fore, especially as it 
interests a legal-academic audience. Piketty's major claim - that cap-
italist societies exhibit a persistent trend of increasing inequality -
should come as a prompt to examine the underlying legal and institu-
tional foundations of capitalist economic relations. And his empirical 
analysis should provide an opening for an interdisciplinary discussion 
to be conducted among scholars working in fields such as philosophy, 
politics, history, sociology, and law. 
I begin in Part II by introducing Piketty's analysis of long-run eco-
nomic trends, particularly in wealth and income inequality. Part III 
develops an internal critique concerning the role of normative evalua-
tion in the construction of the index numbers on which his empirical 
analysis depends. Across these two Parts, I introduce Piketty's main 
findings and suggest how his conclusions indicate deeper issues that 
his data do not independently resolve, including the normative import 
of the increasing inequality he catalogs and the underlying determi-
nants of the rate of return on capital, which is at the heart of his ar-
gument. Accordingly, in Part IV, I consider capitalism understood as a 
legal ordering. Here I develop an account of the "laws" of capitalism, 
understood not as statistical regularities obtaining in a given socioeco-
11 See, e.g., James K. Galbraith, Kapitalfor the Twenty-First Century?, DISSENT, Spring 2or4, 
at 77; Dean Baker, Economic Policy in a Post-Piketty World, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2r, 
2or4, 6:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dean-baker/economic-policy-in-a-post_b_s r87840 
.html [http://perma.cc/L5UW-J5YY]; Doug Henwood, The Top of the World, BooKFORUM (Apr.-
May 2or4), http://www.bookforum.com/inprint/02 r_or/r2987 [http://perma.cc/VQG7-HWVY]; 
Geoffroy de Lagasnerie, Le manifeste inegalitaire de Thomas Piketty, LIBERATION (Oct. r7, 2or3, 
6:06 PM), http://www.liberation.fr/ economie/ 2 or 3/ ro/ r 7 lie-manifeste-inegalitaire-de-thomas 
-piketty_940345 [http://perma.cc/V326-8YZZ] (offering a critical French reaction). 
12 See Ryan Avent, Reading "Capital": Introduction, THE ECONOMIST: FREE EXCHANGE 
(Feb. 2 7, 2 o r4, r :5 r PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/ 2 o r4/02/book-clu bs [http:// 
perma.ccf7 F8X-E8NU]. 
13 Piketty himself notes the work's interdisciplinary potential, though his own focus is neces-
sarily limited (pp. 32-33). 
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nomic regime, but as the legal structuring that undergirds it - in oth-
er words, the laws of capitalism understood as laws. Finally, in Part V, 
I critically assess Piketty's proposals for taming twenty-first-century 
capitalism through a new transnational regulatory regime. 
II. THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF CAPITALISM 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century is a study of economic inequal-
ity in numerous societies over the last three centuries, with a particular 
focus on the postwar twentieth century. Using income tax and probate 
records, Piketty documents a dramatic increase of inequality in wealth 
and income over the last few decades in the major Western European 
states, the United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia, with similar 
trends in developing countries. Countervailing tendencies obtained in 
the mid-twentieth century, but there are numerous parallels between 
current tendencies and those of earlier times, particularly the Gilded 
Age of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Piketty's sin-
gular contribution is his data: he offers the most comprehensive empir-
ical study to date of a number of important economic trends, drawing 
on the largest data set yet available. 14 
A. Correcting Kuznets 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century is a study of modern inequality -
of differences in income and wealth among people of equal juridical 
status. That market societies produce prodigious inequality of this 
kind was taken for granted by the classical political economists. Adam 
Smith's Wealth of Nations, for instance, opened with a comparison of 
the rich and poor in Europe set against the inequality of primitive so-
ciety.15 It was never doubted that the new reliance on the market 
would generate new kinds of inequality. Market advocates simply ar-
gued that even the smallest share of what was produced through the 
modern division of labor would compensate for the loss of a largely 
hypothetical natural equality. 16 More subtly, where natural equality 
had already been undermined by human conventions of a different 
kind, as with slavery and other formal hierarchies, these advocates 
14 See Alvaredo et al., The Top I Percent, supra note 7; Atkinson et al., supra note 7; and 
Piketty, supra note 7 for the articles that first made use of these data. The data are now publical-
ly available at The World Top Incomes Database, supra note 7. 
15 I ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 23-24 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Liberty Classics r98r) (r776). Early works 
in what would later be called "economics" are perhaps best understood as moral theories devel-
oped to account for the inequalities resulting from the new "commercial society." On this point, 
see Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff, Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations, in WEALTH 
AND VIRTUE r, r3-44 (Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff eds., r983). 
16 See Hont & Ignatieff, supra note r5, at 3-6, 23-25. 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 128:626 
hoped that increasing reliance on the market would generate juridical 
equality, since market exchange was thought to be predicated upon, 
and reinforcing of, particular forms of mutual regard among contract-
ing agentsY But while the transition to juridical equality and market 
reciprocity may have helped dissolve vestigial feudal relations, particu-
larly in the countryside, it left the problem of "modern" inequality un-
solved. In response, later critics such as John Stuart Mill and Marx 
argued that productive organization and the distribution of wealth had 
to be understood as ultimately political issues, and they advocated 
more equitable social and economic arrangements within societies al-
ready transformed by modern commerce. 18 
Piketty's book returns us to these classical debates on capitalism and 
inequality. However, it is neither Smith nor Marx but the twentieth-
century economist Simon Kuznets who serves as his main foil. Kuz-
nets won a Nobel Prize in 1971 for his study of U.S. economic growth 
and national income between 1913 and 1948. His study arguably 
revealed a trend in capitalism toward initially increasing but later 
decreasing inequality - the inverted U-shaped relationship now 
dubbed the "Kuznets Curve" (pp. 13-15). Piketty sees his own re-
search as broadening "the spatial and temporal limits of Kuznets's in-
novative and pioneering work" (p. 16). 19 Bringing in more countries 
and a longer time horizon - strictly speaking three centuries, though 
adequate data are generally available only for the twentieth - leads 
Piketty to revise Kuznets's argument in two ways. First, the spatial 
broadening to include most major developed countries reveals that 
similar dynamics occur more widely, albeit with some variation owing 
to differences of national policy. 20 Second, Piketty's temporal broaden-
17 See Emma Rothschild, Adam Smith and Conservative Economics, 45 ECON. HIST. REV. 74 
(r992) for an account of Smith's renown in his own time as a social radical, and the posthumous 
change in his reputation. 
18 See, for example, JOHN STUART MILL, Chapters on Socialism, in ESSAYS ON ECONOM-
ICS AND SOCIETY 703 (J.M. Robson ed., r967); and for a key transformation in his thought 
(which dovetailed with his late-life support for unionism), see John Stuart Mill, Thornton on La-
bour and Its Claims Part I, 29 FORT. REV. 505 (r869); and John Stuart Mill, Thornton on Labor 
and Its Claims Part II, 29 FORT. REV. 680 (r869). Marx's comments on these matters are scat-
tered across different works. For a careful study of the emancipatory and egalitarian aspirations 
in Marx's thought, see ALLEN w. WOOD, THE FREE DEVELOPMENT OF EACH 252-73 (2or4). 
l9 For Kuznets's original work, see SIMON KUZNETS, SHARES OF UPPER INCOME GROUPS 
IN INCOME AND SAVINGS (r953). For work questioning Kuznets's findings, see Sudhir Anand & 
S.M.R. Kanbur, The Kuznets Process and the Inequality-Development Relationship, 40 J. DEV. 
ECON. 25 (r993); A.B. Atkinson, Bringing Income Distribution in from the Cold, ro7 ECON. J. 
297 (r997); and Pedro Concei~ao & James K. Galbraith, Toward a New Kuznets Hypothesis, in 
INEQUALITY AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE r39 (James K. Galbraith & Maureen Berner eds., 
2oor). 
20 On the argument that these national policy variations constitute different "varieties" of capi-
talism, see Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIE-
TIES OF CAPITALISM r (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2oor). 
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ing shows that Kuznets was charting a historical anomaly. Inequality 
may have decreased in the United States in the middle of the twentieth 
century, but it returned. Indeed, it has increased throughout what we 
may call the post-postwar period of the 1970s and 1980s, which began 
with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crisis, and the Ameri-
can military withdrawal from Indochina; encompassed stagnating 
growth, rising inflation, and labor unrest in the North Atlantic world; 
and was capped by conservative electoral victories in the United States 
and most European countries and the collapse of ambitious schemes of 
national economic planning, such as that of Mitterrand's France in the 
early l98os.21 To look back and name the immediate postwar decades 
the trente glorieuses - as French demographer Professor Jean Fou-
rastie did as early as 197922 - is to identify them as an anomaly. 23 
Nonetheless, Kuznets's study remains widely influential. 24 
Part of the attraction of the "Kuznets Curve" is its suggestion, at 
least in its popularized version, that further economic growth will au-
tomatically correct the problems that growth itself brings - and with-
out having to elaborate the causal mechanisms that bring about such 
self-correction. In Kuznets's original study, the problem was income 
inequality, and Kuznets was appropriately circumspect about the limits 
of his model and the generality of his conclusions.25 Others have sub-
sequently argued, however, that the same inverted U-shaped relation-
ship suggesting a "self-correcting market mechanism" obtains in many 
21 For two contemporaneous analyses of Mitterrand's program and its reversal, see Mark 
Kesselman, Lyrical Illusions or a Socialism of Governance: Whither French Socialism?, in 
SOCIALIST REGISTER 233-48 (Ralph Miliband et al. eds., r986); and George Ross & Jane Jen-
son, The Tragedy of the French Left, NEW LEFT REV., Sept.-Oct. r988, at 5. For retrospective 
assessments, see PHILIP SHORT, MITTERRAND 36r-76 (2or3), which describes Mitterrand's ear-
ly economic agenda and its collapse; and Arthur Goldhammer & George Ross, Reluctantly Center-
Left? The French Case, in WHAT'S LEFT OF THE LEFT r4r (James Cronin et al. eds., 2orr), 
which discusses the entry of France into the EEC and the constraints of the Maastricht Treaty 
and subsequent French Socialist politics. 
22 See JEAN FOURASTIE, LES TRENTE GLORIEUSES (r979). 
23 For an analysis of the postwar experience in the United States, see THE GOLDEN AGE OF 
CAPITALISM (Stephen A. Marglin & Juliet B. Schor eds., r990). 
24 For criticisms of it before Piketty, see Anand & Kanbur, supra note rg; and Atkinson, supra 
note rg. 
25 Piketty contrasts Kuznets's circumspection in his r953 book, see KUZNETS, supra note rg, 
with the more popular rendering he gave in a later presidential address to the American Econom-
ic Association, see Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. 
REV. r, r-28 (r955), (pp. r3-r4). 
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other areas: environmental degradation,26 health outcomes,27 and edu-
cational opportunities,28 for example. Given the right time-series data 
for the right set of countries, one could presumably show no long-run 
trade-off between growth and cultural preservation, labor rights, de-
mocracy, or other social goals that might seem to require countermand-
ing the market. 
Piketty's comprehensive reassessment of Kuznets's data has unset-
tled the confidence that the market will "self-correct" in terms of ine-
quality and highlighted instead the exceptional nature of the postwar 
period. Current levels of inequality more closely resemble those of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when unequal asset 
ownership proved hugely determinative (if not completely dispositive) 
of an individual's life chances (pp. 237-42, 260-65). Under this "pat-
rimonial capitalism," as he calls it, class stratification - and its politi-
cal corollary, the oligarchic control of the state - was an overwhelm-
ing economic, cultural, and social reality. Piketty's finding that 
modern economic data reflect this earlier pattern suggests that the 
same social, cultural, and political effects may soon be upon us, if they 
are not already. 
B. Capitalism and Inequality 
Much of the explanation for the "Piketty phenomenon" must be 
that his empirical analyses confirm in the register of the statistical a 
reality we already intuit. In that register, the seemingly particular is 
revealed as general; the apparently contingent is shown to form a co-
herent history that is both long-running and cross-continental. This 
empirical ratification flatly contradicts earlier narratives concerning 
the relationship between capitalism, equality, and democracy that have 
long been taken for granted by the many people of North America and 
Europe who got ahead in the postwar period but whose children and 
grandchildren look increasingly unlikely to be able to do the same. 29 
What are the data? Piketty's central findings reveal a basic pat-
tern, with some national variation, of increasing inequality of both 
26 See James Andreoni & Arik Levinson, The Simple Analytics of the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve, So J. PUB. ECON. 269 (2001); Theodore Panayotou, Demystifying the Environmental Kuz-
nets Curve: Turning a Black Box into a Policy Tool, 2 ENV'T & DEV. ECON. 465 (1997). For a 
critical analysis, see David I. Stern, The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 32 
WORLD DEV. 1419 (2004). 
27 For evidence of a "Kuznets curve" on self-reported health (but not other measures), see Joan 
Costa-Font et al., A 'Health Kuznets' Curve? Cross-Country and Longitudinal Evidence (CESifo, 
Working Paper No. 4446, 2013). 
28 Vinod Thomas et al., Measuring Education Inequality: Gini Coefficients of Education 18-
19 (World Bank Inst., Policy Research Working Paper No. 2525, 2001). 
29 See PIKETTY, supra note 8, at 250-62 for a discussion of asset ownership across a range of 
societies, including the United States. 
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wealth and income over the last four decades, with corresponding in-
creases in the value of privately owned (as against public) capital and 
in the share of total national income going to capital rather than labor. 
While Piketty's major findings can be expressed succinctly, it took an 
enormous effort in data collection and analysis to produce them. 
To take income first, one of Piketty's most striking graphs (p. 24 
fig. Lr) shows income inequality in the United States from r9ro to 
2oro, considered as the share of total national income taken by the top 
decile (the top ro% ). The line forms a broad U-shaped curve with de-
creasing inequality in the mid-century and a return to earlier levels of 
inequality from the late 1970s to the present. Decomposing the top 
decile shows the outsized influence of the top r% in skewing the U.S. 
distribution (p. 292 fig. 8.6). This trend is replicated across the major 
Anglophone countries (Britain, Australia, and Canada), though U.S. 
levels of inequality have been markedly higher in recent decades 
(p. 316 fig. 9.2). By contrast, income inequality across the major con-
tinental European countries, and in Japan, has increased much more 
gradually since the 1970s or 1980s, with the share taken by the top 
percentile of incomes broadly flat since the mid-century (p. 3 r 7 fig. 
9.3). The data from the major developing countries are both more er-
ratic and less complete but generally reveal rising inequality from 
roughly the 1980s (p. 327 fig. 9.9). 
FIGURE I.r: INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE 
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FIGURE 8.6: DECOMPOSITION OF THE TOP 
DECILE, UNITED STATES, r9ro-2oro 
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The rise of the top decile income share since the 1970s 1s mostly due to the top percentile. 
Sources and series see piketty.pse.ens fr/capital21c. 
FIGURE 9.2: INCOME INEQUALITY IN 
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FIGURE 9.3: INCOME INEQUALITY IN CONTINENTAL 
EUROPE AND JAPAN, 1910-2010 
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The share of income taken by the upper decile in 2oro varies across 
a range of countries, but it has followed the same broad trajectory 
(p. 323 fig. 9. 7): a dip in the mid-century from Gilded Age heights and 
then a slow return. Some countries, such as Sweden, are still well be-
low their 1900 levels, but others are closing in on those levels or, in the 
case of the United States, surpassing them. None seem exempt from 
increasing inequality, though some countries, such as France, have 
fared better than others. 
FIGURE 9. 7: THE TOP DECILE INCOME SHARE IN EUROPE 
AND THE UNITED STATES, 1900-20!0 
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Some of this increase in income inequality reflects the growth of 
"supersalaries," the high incomes going to corporate executives and 
"supermanagers" of other people's money (pp. 315-35), particularly in 
the United States (pp. 298-303), but a great deal reflects a widening 
gap in nonwage income (capital gains and the like), driven by corre-
sponding trends in wealth inequality. While wealth inequality de-
clined in the United States from the early twentieth century until 
about 1970, it has gradually increased since then, with the top decile of 
wealth holders owning about 75% of national wealth in 2oro (p. 348 
fig. ro.5). Trends for the highest percentile of wealth holders are simi-
lar, with the top 1% now owning approximately 35% of national as-
sets. The major European countries (p. 349 fig. ro.6) demonstrate a 
similar pattern but with a steeper drop in postwar wealth inequality 
and without as great of a return to prior levels as in the United States, 
a result presumably of the much more violent mid-century experience 
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FIGURE ro.5: WEALTH INEQUALITY IN 
THE UNITED STATES, r8ro-2oro 
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FIG URE ro.6: WEALTH INEQUALITY IN EUROPE VERSUS 
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Wealth inequality in both Europe and the United States is now so 
great that inheritance flows make up a substantial share of the econo-
my. Data from Germany, France, and the United Kingdom show 
bowed curves charting the decline of inheritance (as a percentage of 
national income) in the mid-century and its gradual recovery, albeit to 
levels roughly half those in r 900 (p. 42 5 fig. r r. r 2 ). What this means, 
as Piketty details in the case of France, is that the fraction of each de-
mographic cohort that receives an inheritance equal to or greater than 
the amount a member of the bottom half of the income distribution 
earns over a lifetime is now roughly 15%, which is many times greater 
than in the early twentieth century (when family sizes and other fac-
tors reduced inheritance flows), and even significantly higher than in 
the nineteenth century (p. 42 r fig. r r.r r). These are not necessarily 
vast fortunes - Piketty calls these heirs "petits rentiers" (p. 420) -
but they offer a significant advantage to the descendants of roughly 
the upper decile of the wealth distribution. 
FIGURE rr.12: THE INHERITANCE FLOW IN EUROPE, r900-2oro 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
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FIGURE II.II: WHICH FRACTION OF A COHORT RECEIVES IN 
INHERITANCE THE EQUIVALENT OF A LIFETIME LABOR INCOME? 
1810 1830 1850 1870 189Q 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 21)30 
Of course, much of the popular interest in inequality concerns not 
these modest inheritances left by small businessmen and professionals, 
but the dramatic, worldwide rise of the superrich. Focusing on a small 
handful of fortunes within the top I%, Piketty shows a triple and 
quadruple increase in the share of global private wealth owned respec-
tively by the I/20 million fractile and the I/roo million fractile - I 
person out of 20 million and I out of roo million - over the last quar-
ter century (p. 436 fig. I 2 .3). The share taken by billionaires over the 
same period rose from 0-4% to r.5% (p. 434 fig. I2.2), while the num-
ber of billionaires increased from approximately I in 20 million to I in 
3 million (p. 434). 
FIGURE I2.3: THE SHARE OF TOP WEALTH FRACTILES IN 
WORLD WEALTH, Ig87-20I3 
1.0% r;:==========:-:--.---r--.---,---i 
0.9% ---Wealth share of the 1/20 m1ll1on fract1le 
2002 2005 200$ 2011 
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FIGURE 12.2: BILLIONAIRES AS A FRACTION OF GLOBAL 
POPULATION AND WEALTH, 1987-2013 
Piketty's initial publicity came from his studies of the top of the in-
come and wealth distributions. His percentage estimates give us a 
sense of the magnitude of the growth of the superrich, but we must re-
individuate (so to speak) to understand the full impact of his data. A 
few hundred individuals now possess fortunes so vast that their wealth 
represents not so much private luxury as public power. They can buy 
media corporations30 and private military contractors;31 they can sway 
individual elections and determine electoral trends. 32 When they de-
cide to engage in philanthropy, they can direct expenditures on a scale 
that rivals the capacity of almost any national government or interna-
tional organization, and thus reorient humanitarian, cultural, and sci-
entific agendas to their personal priorities. 33 They can coo pt state 
functions to preserve or extend their wealth through privatizations, 
special bailouts, and preferential treatment of various kinds, which so-
cializes risk while privatizing profit. 34 The main consolation for those 
30 For a list of the current holdings of the Murdoch media empire, see Who Owns What, 
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., http://www.cjr.org/resources/?c=newscorp (last updated Oct. 24, 
2or4, 3:49 PM) [http://perma.cc/LN75-NQT8]. 
31 See, e.g., Bruce Falconer & Daniel Schulman, Blackwater's World of Warcraft, MOTHER 
JONES, Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 70. 
32 See MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE 24r-52 (2or2); Martin Gilens & 
Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Cit-
izens, I2 PERSP. ON POL. 564 (2or4). 
33 See, e.g., Marc Parry et al., The Gates Effect, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July r4, 2or3, at 
Ar8. 
34 See generally COLIN LEYS, MARKET-DRIVEN POLITICS (2003). 
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worried about this enormous concentration of power is that, like the 
rest of us, even these very privileged individuals will eventually die. 
But Piketty's point is that their fortunes don't. 
C. Growth and the Rate of Return on Capital 
In marshaling these data, Piketty introduces two equations that he 
calls the "fundamental laws of capitalism." In explaining them, he in-
troduces a third formula, and it is this that has been widely dubbed 
Piketty's "law of capitalism." The first law Piketty proposes is that the 
share of national income going to capital, a, is equal to the rate of re-
turn on capital, r, multiplied by the ratio of capital to income, ~' ex-
pressed a= r x ~(pp. 50-55).35 This is an accounting identity that al-
lows Piketty to relate the ratio of the value of capital assets to the 
value of annual production - (the ratio ~) - to the share of total in-
come going to capital owners, via the rate of return on their assets 
(p. 222 fig. 6.5). Piketty's second law is that the ratio of capital to in-
come reflects the ratio of the savings rate to the overall growth rate, 
expressed ~ = s I g (pp. 166-70). This second law is not actuarial but 
asymptotic: in the long run, given various assumptions, the relation-
ship of the value of national assets to national income will be deter-
mined by the ratio of savings to annual growth. 
FIGURE 6.5: THE CAPITAL SHARE IN RICH COUNTRIES, r975-2oro 
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Capital income absorbs between 15% and 25% of national income in rich countries in 1970, and between 25% and 
30% in 2000-2010. Sources and senes see p1ketty pse ens fr/cap1tal21c 
2010 
35 Piketty offers the fairly typical example of a country with total capital stock equivalent to 
six years' national income(~= 6 or 600%) which, given an annual rate of return on capital of 5% 
would mean capital's share in national income, a, is 30% (p. 52). 
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Both of these "laws" are familiar formulas used to generate eco-
nomic statistics; neither of them explains why inequality has returned 
in the post-postwar period. To address that question, Piketty tracks 
the relationship between the return on capital, r, and the rate of 
growth, g. What he finds is that across the prior centuries of capital-
ism (as well as in a rather speculative back-projection to the economic 
history of earlier periods36) the return on capital has consistently out-
paced the average growth of the economy as a whole, an inequality 
expressed r > g (p. 354 fig. I0.9). Much follows from this inequality, 
including an increased accumulation of capital and concentration of its 
ownership; a higher share of capital's take of overall national income; 
an increase not only in inequalities of wealth but also in incomes, giv-
en the portions of income coming from capital; and the possibility of 
"supersalaries" for the managers of capital assets. Fundamentally, it 
signals a preponderance of capital over labor in the generation and 
distribution of income and wealth: "[C]apital reproduces itself faster 
than output increases" (p. 571). However, a burst of twentieth-century 
growth - that is, a high value for g - coincided with greater taxation 
and destruction of assets - leading to a low value for r - which to-
gether moderated and even temporarily reversed the inequality be-
tween the after-tax rate of return on capital and annual growth rates 
(p. 356 fig. IO.IO). What made the postwar decades exceptional, there-
fore, is that they atypically saw a higher rate of growth, g, than 
posttax rate of return on capital, r, which resulted in a decrease in in-
equality. Piketty suggests, though, that this result was temporary and 
that in the twenty-first century the rate of return on capital will once 
again exceed the growth rate, resulting in an expansion of inequality. 
36 Piketty's view of premodern or precapitalist history may be captured in his straightline ex-
trapolation in Figure ro.9 from antiquity to early modernity. While this extrapolation is faulty in 
many respects, it is also inessential to his main purposes (p. 354). For an account of changing 
growth across several centuries in the Roman world (which would put pressure on any 
straightline extrapolation), see the seminal work of Keith Hopkins. Economic Growth and Towns 
in Classical Antiquity, in TOWNS IN SOCIETIES 35, 35-77 (Philip Abrams & E.A. Wrigley eds., 
r978), which subsequently launched a reexamination of this question; and see also Keith Hopkins, 
Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire ( 200 B.C.-A.D. 400), 70 J. ROMAN STUD. ror (r980). 
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FIGURE I0.9: RATE OF RETURN VERSUS GROWTH RATE AT THE 
WORLD LEVEL, FROM ANTIQUITY UNTIL 2 IOO 
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The rate of return to caprtal (pre-tax) has always been higher than the world growth rate, but the gap was 
reduced during the 2oth century, and might widen again 1n the 21st century. 
Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c 
FIGURE IO.IO: AFTER TAX RATE OF RETURN VERSUS GROWTH 
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and may again surpass it 1n the 21st century. Sources and series see piketty.pse.ens fr/capital21c 
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In many reviews of the book, this inequality, r > g, has been termed 
the "law" of capitalism, and perhaps it should be dubbed "Piketty's 
law," though he does not claim it as such. Indeed, he seems divided as 
to whether it resembles a lawlike necessity at all. He sometimes dis-
cusses it as a quasi-natural fact, while at other times he emphasizes 
that it obtains only in particular political contexts.37 Tellingly, he gives 
it a variety of names: a "fundamental inequality" or "fundamental 
force for divergence" (p. 25), a "mechanism of wealth divergence" (p. 
350), a "historical fact" (p. 353), a "contingent historical proposition" (p. 
358), and finally, in the conclusion, the "central contradiction of capi-
talism" (p. 5 71) and the "fundamental structural contradiction of capi-
talism" (p. 572). It is, of course, all of these things, but it is neither an 
actuarial identity (like the first law) nor a long-run condition (like the 
second). It is at once a historical generalization drawing on his empiri-
cal analysis and a conceptual frame in which to make sense of the 
data. 
Why, then, has r > g held generally? Piketty has painstakingly es-
tablished that it has, and he has some suggestions as to how it under-
girds the more visible inequalities of income and wealth (pp. 361-66, 
3 72-7 5). As for its ultimate causes, however, we must treat Piketty's 
book as a catalyst for further research on the legal, social, political, 
and economic dimensions of inequality under capitalism, as he himself 
hopes it will be (pp. 573-75).38 
III. QUESTIONING THE NUMBERS: INDEXING AND EVALUATION 
Piketty's conclusions depend on an immense exercise in data collec-
tion and analysis. Where he and his collaborators have reliable data,39 
they are usually the result of working with tax records, supplemented 
by other sources, to estimate individual incomes and estate valua-
37 Compare PIKETTY, supra note 8, at r ("When the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate 
of growth ... capitalism automatically generates ... inequalities .... "(emphasis added)), with id. 
at 25 ("If ... the rate of return on capital remains significantly above the growth rate ... then the 
risk of divergence in the distribution of wealth is very high." (emphasis added)). More generally, 
see Piketty's statement that "the inequality r > g should be analyzed as a historical reality depen-
dent on a variety of mechanisms and not as an absolute logical necessity" (p. 36r). 
38 Cf id. at 30-33. 
39 Piketty's numbers are less persuasive where he must rely on extensive historical reconstruc-
tions, as during the first two hundred years of capitalism (r700-r900), with the important excep-
tion of France, where the Revolution's introduction of estate taxes created a fuller documentary 
record than in any other society (pp. 33 7-39). For this early economic history, he mainly relies on 
the extensive estimates produced by Angus Maddison and his collaborators, which are available 
online. See MADDISON PROJECT, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2or4); see also Jutta Bolt & Jan Luiten van Zanden, The First Update of the 
Maddison Project: Re-Estimating Growth Before I820 (The Maddison Project, Working Paper 
No. 4, 2or3). For Piketty's speculations on premodern economic history, see supra note 36. 
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tions.40 His argument moves from the unobserved fact of some real 
activity (such as the production of commodities) through an aggrega-
tion of data from records partly reflecting that activity (such as a re-
port of individual income) to a set of statistics generated from the im-
position of complex analytical concepts (such as the "return on 
capital"). Using these statistics, he then delineates broad historical 
trends (for example, diagnosing the reemergence of "patrimonial 
capitalism") and formulates policy responses (such as a progressive 
global wealth tax) to undesirable ones. 
Each link in this chain can be questioned. Most obviously, his data 
are subject to all the usual problems affecting observable variables, 
compounded by the fact that tax records usually involve self-reporting, 
while different tax regimes may exempt entire categories of income. 
Piketty recognizes these problems and notes they will normally result 
in an underestimate of inequality (pp. 267-70, 281-84). However, in 
comparisons of inequality between countries, particularly between 
ones that do not have equally developed tax systems, the reliance on 
tax data may exaggerate levels of intranational inequality. 41 His calcu-
lations are also open to technical disputes,42 although these will not 
always be significant. As he himself suggests, his numbers should be 
used as rough guides to the magnitude of inequality in the world to-
day. Their purpose is to establish broad trends, not to present precise 
estimates (pp. 61-67). 
A less obvious complexity concerns the normative and conceptual 
presuppositions of Piketty's estimates. These presuppositions affect 
the middle links of the argumentative chain sketched above - when 
data of disparate kinds, such as reports of different prices or incomes, 
are combined into a single representative "index number." An index 
number is an aggregate measure constructed out of multidimensional 
data - in other words, a number made up of component numbers. 
The most important indices for Piketty's analysis are measures of na-
tional income and wealth, each of which attempts to provide a metric 
comparable across time and space. For income, this means an index 
representing all the goods and services produced in a country in a giv-
en period; for wealth, it means the market value of all the assets used 
40 For more on Piketty's sources, see PIKETTY, supra note 8, at r6-20; and Alvaredo et al., 
The Top I Percent, supra note 7. 
41 See Galbraith, supra note r r, at So. For another study that confronts this same challenge, 
see James K. Galbraith & Jiaqing Lu, Measuring the Evolution of Inequality in the Global Econ-
omy, in INEQUALITY AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE, supra note rg, at r6r. 
42 See, e.g., Chris Giles, Data Problems with Capital in the 2Ist Century, FIN. TIMES: MON-
EY SUPPLY (May 23, 2or4, 7:or PM), http://blogs.ft.com/money-supply/2or4/05/23/data-problems 
-with-capital-in-the-2 rst-century. Though none of these problems seem to require revision of 
Piketty's conclusions, the laudable decision to post all his data online (which is not yet standard 
practice) will allow further scrutiny of this kind. 
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in the production of those goods and services. Only by aggregating in 
this way can Piketty compare, for example, the GDP of France in 1900 
with that of France or Britain in 2000. 
An "index number system" - the method for generating a particu-
lar index - incorporates decisions about which component numbers to 
include and how to weigh them against one another in the process of 
aggregation. Each of these decisions requires a judgment that is inde-
pendent from the assessment of the accuracy of the component num-
bers and any subsequent calculations, and these judgments are inher-
ently contestable.43 Unavoidably debatable reasoning thus sits behind 
Piketty's estimates, giving rise to numerous issues of conceptual and 
normative interest. Two are especially important: his use of index num-
bers to capture the normative salience of inequalities of income and 
wealth and his derivation of an average rate of return on capital, which is 
necessary to articulate the "fundamental inequality of capitalism." 
A. Welfare and Well-Being 
Estimates of real national income depend on establishing a bench-
mark that can serve as a point of comparison, such as a representative 
basket of consumer goods specified for a particular time and place. 
There is a point of complexity about this benchmark, however, because 
even a basket chosen for a specific geographic locale will change over 
time in terms of composition (and, ultimately, social meaning), which 
makes evaluating economic inequality much more complex than mea-
suring it. 44 Often, selected goods will no longer be available at the 
same store at which they were previously purchased - this happens at 
a rate of about 20% a year.45 Further, goods may simply disappear 
from the market entirely, replaced by new models or alternative com-
modities. 46 Goods may also be deemed no longer adequately repre-
sentative of consumer habits and deliberately dropped from the basket. 
Quality, too, changes in ways that are hard to capture, and the ap-
pearance of new products generates additional problems - as does the 
fact that, even at a fixed time and space, the relevant market basket 
may differ for different groups of consumers. Debate persists about 
how to capture these changes in a single index number. 47 As Professor 
Erwin Diewert summarizes the issue: 
43 On the normative dimensions of index number construction, see Sanjay Reddy & Benjamin 
Plener, The Choice of Index Number: Part I, Valuation and Evaluation (Inst. for Soc. & Econ. Re-
search & Policy, Working Paper No. 06-02, 2006). 
44 For a general discussion of these issues (including the Laspeyres and Paasche approaches to 
national income indices), see W. Erwin Diewert, Index Number Issues in the Consumer Price In-
dex, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1998, at 47, 47-49. 
45 Id. at 52. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 52-55; see also Reddy & Plener, supra note 43, at 3-5. 
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The basic problem is that traditional index number theory assumes that 
the set of commodities is fixed and unchanging from period to period, so 
that like can be compared to like. Unfortunately, the real world is not so 
accommodating: new products, outlets and consumers appear; other prod-
ucts, outlets and consumers disappear. It is simply impossible to decom-
pose period-to-period value changes into completely objective price and 
quantity components.48 
The changing basket of goods means we are often comparing like 
with unlike, which leads to difficulties when attempting to give na-
tional income statistics a consistent welfare-theoretic interpretation. 
For instance, if we want to know how much additional income a per-
son needs to be as well off as she was at an earlier time, we must as-
sume that even a changing basket of goods will remain representative 
of a fixed level of welfare. However, over any period long enough to 
see fundamental changes in the relevant consumption profile - in-
cluding in the social meaning of consumption, particularly of 
"positional goods"49 - this cannot be the case. We require not simply 
a numerical comparison but an evaluation of what conduces to welfare 
at each point in time, including judgments about how the capacity to 
command certain commodities may affect individuals in the eyes of 
others.50 Such an evaluation can only be made relative to a postulat-
ed, if implicit, baseline that must itself be coherent and normatively 
salient for the measure to have meaning, as recent work in the theory 
of index numbers reveals.51 Pursuing this approach requires scrutiniz-
48 Diewert, supra note 44, at 55. 
49 Positional goods either are scarce in some absolute or socially imposed sense, or else take 
their value from their exclusivity - and lose value when they are consumed more widely. See 
FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 27-3r (r976). 
50 For careful studies of the dimensions of inequality, including how its meaning and mea-
surement are connected, see AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (r992) [hereinafter 
SEN, REEXAMINED]; AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (r973); and see also Mi-
chael J. Boskin et al., Consumer Prices, the Consumer Price Index, and the Cost of Living, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Winter r998, at 3, which discusses changes to the consumer price index and pro-
vides an account of the technical matters involved in constructing a welfare-consistent compari-
son; and Diewert, supra note 44. 
51 Professor Sanjay Reddy and his collaborators have developed an "exogeneity theorem," 
which shows that index number systems possess generally desirable properties (such as relevance 
and consistency across comparison units) only if they can be shown to "correspond to a single im-
plicit or explicit normative criterion," Reddy & Plener, supra note 43, at 43. See id. at 42-43. The 
technical details of the theorem are outside the scope of this Essay, but it elaborates the underly-
ing principle that "[e]very index number system compares units of comparison to one another ac-
cording to some invariant concept," id. at 43. Index number systems that are not based on an 
invariant and normatively salient baseline will fail to produce coherent measurements, as Reddy 
and his collaborators demonstrate in the case of poverty estimates based on the widely used 
$r/day and $z/day standards. These statistics are incoherent because the "purchasing power pari-
ty" indices used in their construction are based on the prices of baskets of goods that include 
commodities that no poor person buys, which distorts the measurement of poverty that the index 
is meant to capture. See Sanjay G. Reddy & Camelia Minoiu, Has World Poverty Really Fallen?, 
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ing the ethical foundations of welfare economics and constructing em-
pirical measures that can capture complex judgments about well-being 
that may go beyond using individual preference-satisfaction as a proxy 
for welfare. 52 
Consider the complexities in contrasting the consumption profile 
enabled in the United States by a "middle class" income in 1960 and 
2oro. It is not simply that the price and quality of cars, dishwashers, 
televisions, and trips to Europe have changed markedly as these be-
came widely consumed. It is also that other goods - for example, 
family houses near desirable urban areas or a college education -
have become less affordable, while entirely new infrastructures, such 
as the Internet, have generated vast classes of new goods, which have 
changed the meanings (and the prices) of all the rest. It is not possible 
to represent all these changes in a single number that is meaningful in 
welfare terms without referring to an invariant and normatively sali-
ent baseline, which requires an evaluative judgment that must precede 
and direct any measurement. Would you rather be a "middle class" 
consumer of 1960, with the reasonable hope of owning your house, or 
a "middle class" consumer today, living in a rented flat but with a per-
sonal computer and Internet access? Likewise, what it means to be 
relatively rich or poor - to be in the top ro% or bottom ro% of an in-
come distribution - will vary across national contexts. The transla-
tion of unequal economic resources into unequal outcomes in other ar-
eas - education, health, social standing, political power - is not 
automatic but depends on the ways that nonmarket institutions medi-
ate market outcomes in different policy settings. 
Piketty recognizes the shortcomings of synthetic indices53 and the 
normativity of all measures of inequality,54 and he frequently elabo-
rates his own numbers with reference to cultural or literary evidence 
that helps provide context (for example, pp. ro4-15). But it can re-
main unclear - particularly over long periods of time - just what he 
is measuring, even when he works with simple distribution tables 
showing nothing more than the fractional share of income or wealth 
53 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 484 (2007); Sanjay G. Reddy & Thomas Pogge, How Not to Count 
the Poor, in DEBATES ON THE MEASUREMENT OF GLOBAL POVERTY 42 (Sudhir Anand et 
al. eds., 2oro). 
52 See generally AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT (r982). Profes-
sor Amartya Sen 's work has led to critiques of the normative salience and analytic coherence of 
many existing measures of welfare (such as GDP) and to the proposal of new measures thought to 
better capture the normatively relevant aspects of human development. See, e.g., Marc Fleurbaey, 
Beyond the GDP: The Quest for a Measure of Social Welfare, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE ro29 
(2009). 
53 See PIKETTY, supra note 8, at 266 (''[I]t is impossible to summarize a multidimensional real-
ity with a unidimensional index ... . ");see also id. at 86-87. 
54 See id. at 270 ("The way one tries to measure inequality is never neutral."). 
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across a country (pp. 266-77). The problem, in this case, is not simply 
that the meaning of consumption changes over time, but that the 
meaning of inequality changes in tandem, particularly as regards those 
goods whose value is determined by what Professor Fred Hirsch called 
"social scarcity. "55 
A natural thought is that what Piketty is measuring has no con-
sistent or objective underlying referent. It is simply inequality as re-
flected in the indices measuring aggregate production, which may be 
thought to reflect unequal purchasing power among citizens across the 
changing historical landscape of capitalist production. Again, howev-
er, the meaning of this inequality requires further interpretation: 
whether citizens are unequal in normatively or politically salient ways 
cannot be determined based on the simple perusal of a distribution ta-
ble without asking what greater wealth or income can command in 
one social context as against another. Related to this difficulty is the 
question why inequality of one kind or another is undesirable, which is 
never examined at length in Capital in the Twenty-First Century, but 
largely assumed - perhaps in part because much recent work in eco-
nomics, political science, and public health has catalogued its negative 
consequences.56 However, absent a more explicit normative assess-
ment of the problems that inequality poses, it will remain unclear 
whether and how best to mitigate it. 
Though these questions must be discussed further, Piketty does rely 
on two different value systems to give normative salience to his num-
bers. The first is a democratic perspective, one concerned with inequi-
ty insofar as it obstructs the articulation and realization of collective 
goals, including management of the economy (pp. 26, 422-24, 569-70). 
The second is what Piketty calls "meritocratic" (pp. 26, 31, 260-62).57 
This perspective reflects what might be considered a bourgeois orien-
tation: an eagerness to see work, talent, and thrift rewarded (pp. 240-
42, 378, 419, 443-44); to protect the asset-owning middle classes from 
the fluctuations of finance (pp. 294-98) and the skyrocketing prices of 
urban real estate (pp. 6, 198, 464); and to preserve higher education 
and a culture of entrepreneurship as avenues of upward social mobility 
(pp. 440-41, 485-87). In the immediate postwar experience of the 
United States and Western Europe, these two normative orientations 
55 See HIRSCH, supra note 49, at 20-22. 
56 See, e.g., SEN, REEXAMINED, supra note 50 (discussing the normative assessment of ine-
quality along different dimensions); RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT 
LEVEL: WHY MORE EQUAL SOCIETIES ALMOST ALWAYS Do BETTER (2009) (discussing the 
negative social and medical impacts of inequality); Gilens & Page, supra note 32 (discussing the 
political consequences of economic inequality). 
57 Cf PIKETTY, supra note 8, at 4r7 (describing "worrisome" overextension of meritocratic 
values driving "greater and more violent inequality"). 
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may not have been in manifest tension. However, as Piketty's own 
analysis suggests, that period was exceptional - and under normal 
circumstances, the successful entrepreneur and diligent businessperson 
eventually become rentiers (pp. 395-96). What this means is that the 
inequality r > g may reflect the predominance of deeply held merito-
cratic values that can, in fact, come into conflict with democratic 
ones - a conflict that Piketty sometimes admits (pp. 334, 416-17, 443-
44) but often obscures (pp. l, 26, 422-24). 
B. Aggregation and Capital 
The aggregation of profits, rents, and other nonlabor incomes to 
produce the average "rate of return on capital" is a second area where 
contestable conceptual and normative evaluations come into play. 
Generating this rate of return (r) is crucial to Piketty's project, for it 
provides one half of the "fundamental inequality of capitalism," r > g.58 
Yet Piketty's deployment of the concept puts him in an interesting 
bind. The model used to calculate r presupposes a conception of capi-
tal as an abstract stock generating an annual flow, as in the standard 
neoclassical production function. 59 However, some of Piketty's own 
conclusions point toward an alternative conception of capital as a so-
cial relation, a view familiar to classical political economy revived in 
the mid-twentieth century to counter the neoclassical view. 60 
At the outset of this debate over capital theory, Professor Joan Rob-
inson argued that capital could not be aggregated using any single 
measure because capital assets include a tremendous variety of goods: 
physical equipment, real estate, trademarks, financial products, and so 
on. 61 The normal remedy - and a move that lies at the heart of the 
neoclassical theory of capital - is to group these disparate entities to-
gether as a homogeneous stock or fund, using their market value to 
render them commensurate. Piketty adopts this approach, yet a prob-
lem arises when we want to calculate the rate of return on capital that 
has been aggregated in this way. According to standard economic the-
58 See id. at 199-208, 213-22, 230-32 (establishing the idea of a rate of return on capital and 
examining some of the controversies in capital theory). 
59 For questions concerning the meaning and measurement of capital in the neoclassical pro-
duction function, see generally Joan Robinson, The Production Function and the Theory of Capi-
tal, 2 r REV. ECON. STUD. Sr (1953-1954); and for an important later contribution, P. Garegnani, 
Heterogeneous Capital, the Production Function and the Theory of Distribution, 37 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 407 (1970). 
60 For a retrospective of this debate, sometimes called the "Cambridge Capital Controversies," 
see Avi J. Cohen & G.C. Harcourt, Retrospectives: Whatever Happened to the Cambridge Capital 
Theory Controversies?, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2003, at 197. For a reconstruction of the argu-
ment, see G. Hodgson, Sraffa, Value and Distribution: An Expository Essay on the Cfrpital Con-
troversy, BRIT. REV. ECON. ISSUES, Nov. 1977, at 44. 
61 See Robinson, supra note 59, at 81-82. 
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ory, the return on capital should be equivalent to its rental price at 
equilibrium - that is, to the cost of hiring capital at a given moment, 
independent of any short-term shocks or anomalies. This return 
should be equal to the "marginal product" of capital, because (assum-
ing equilibrium) the cost of capital will equal the value of the addi-
tional production it enables. The problem with this solution is that 
calculating the equilibrium price of capital assets requires assuming a 
given rate of interest, as shown by several technical results from the 
1960s and r97os. 62 But (again according to standard economic theory) 
the rate of interest is itself endogenously related to the price of capital 
assets: it is supposed to reflect the marginal product of capital. Calcu-
lating the rate of return on capital would thus seem to require assum-
ing the very thing that the calculation is supposed to discover, making 
the exercise circular. 63 
But what determines the rate of return on a capital asset if it is not 
simply the value of the additional production it enables? The force of 
the debate over this question stemmed from the ideological stakes of 
the conventional answer. The theory of marginal productivity was 
thought to naturalize capital and its share of national income, rational-
izing profit as simply what was owed to one factor of production, capi-
tal, just as wages were what was owed to labor.64 Against this, Profes-
sor Piero Sraffa's seminal contribution was to show that the rate of 
return could not be derived from the marginal product of capital but 
was rather an independent variable - given, he suggested, by factors 
"outside the system of production," such as monetary policy. 65 In ef-
fect, according to Sraffa, the equilibrium price of capital goods reflects 
a history of social struggle over the terms of economic cooperation and 
cannot be understood simply in terms of the aggregate production 
function. 
Piketty is not indifferent to the force of this view. He frequently 
discusses the political determinants of the rate of return on capital (pp. 
20, 47, 55, 372-75) and even describes capital early in the book as var-
ying according to "the state of development and prevailing social rela-
62 See sources cited supra notes 59-60. 
63 The attempt to model heterogeneous assets through single-commodity aggregate production 
functions failed, as Professor Paul Samuelson admitted at the conclusion to the Cambridge Con-
troversies. See Cohen & Harcourt, supra note 60, at 206. 
64 The controversy over the measurement and conceptualization of capital was driven by a 
broader concern about the way that mainstream economics conceived of distribution under capi-
talism as nonpolitical. For an important corrective, see Amit Bhaduri, On the Significance of Re-
cent Controversies on Capital Theory: A Marxian View, 79 ECON. J. 532 (1969). 
65 PIERO SRAFFA, PRODUCTION OF COMMODITIES BY MEANS OF COMMODITIES 33 
(r960). More precisely, there must be some exogenous distributive variable - for example, the 
rate of profit or the determination of wages - that brings "closure" to the analytic system. See id. 
at 34-44. 
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tions of each society" (p. 4 7 ). Perhaps his two positions on capital -
conceived of as a measurable stock generating a flow (pp. 47-50), but 
also as a social relation produced through political contest - may be 
thought to present an interesting hybrid position in the controversy 
over capital theory. On one interpretation, what the critics of the neo-
classical position were suggesting was not simply that it is incoherent 
to attempt to value capital without positing an exogenous rate of re-
turn, but also that "capital" does not really exist in any determinate 
fashion. Rather, what exists is legally structured access to the variety 
of resources that people use to produce things, and the market value of 
this access cannot be determined without examining its distribution -
which is necessarily given by politics and social conditions rather than 
by a purely technical process. 66 While critics have argued that Piketty 
missed this point, owing to his use of standard neoclassical formula-
tions, 67 it may nevertheless be possible to interpret his conclusions 
sympathetically. What he has estimated is not a physical stock of stuff 
so much as the market valuation of the extent of capitalist privilege, 
ramified across a range of assets from houses to machines to software 
programs, which he recognizes has varied across historical periods as a 
result of changing economic policy (pp. 372-75). Perhaps his analysis 
can thus be said to be Sraffian in spite of itself: we may note the inco-
herence of trying to assume an aggregate rate of return on capital even 
while recognizing that the deepest import of Piketty's work will be to 
bring renewed attention to the view that distribution is a social and 
political issue. 
IV. CAPITALISM AS A LEGAL ORDERING 
Understanding why r > g has generally held - and why it briefly did 
not - requires an account of capitalism as a socioeconomic system struc-
tured through law. Capitalism is fundamentally a legal ordering: the 
bargains at the heart of capitalism are products of law. While these legal 
foundations go mostly unexamined in Capital in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, the book should prompt further study of the actual laws of capi-
talism - those behind the statistical regularities discussed as "laws" -
66 Distributional outcomes can affect the way that production occurs in the first place through 
a variety of mechanisms, including the choice of production technology (as in the "reswitching" 
argument), or through the path-dependent stimulation of aggregate demand in one fashion as 
against another. See Cohen & Harcourt, supra note 60, at 202-04. 
67 See, e.g., Galbraith, supra note r r, at 78-79 (arguing that Piketty's treatment of the Cam-
bridge Capital Controversy is "wildly misleading"); Benjamin Kunkel, Paupers and Richlings, 
LONDON REV. BOOKS, July 3, 2or4, at r7; Dean Baker, Thomas Piketty and the Ghost of Joan Rob-
inson, CENTER FOR ECON. & POL'Y RES.: BEAT THE PRESS (May r, 2or4, 8:r6 PM), http://www 
. cepr.net/index. p h p/blogs/bea t-the-press/the-ghos t-of-joan-ro bin son -and-thomas-piketty /print [http:// 
perma.cc/9RKS-F4S7] (arguing that claims by the Cambridge, United Kingdom, side of the con-
troversy are in tension with Piketty's theory). 
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that is, of the various legal and institutional arrangements governing 
capitalist economic systems. In this task, a range of insights from legal 
scholarship may be usefully deployed, particularly if oriented to the 
study of specifically capitalist economic and social relations. 
Before the term "capitalism" became widespread in the late nine-
teenth century, the regime in which most people secure material needs 
through market exchange was simply called "commercial society." The 
legal underpinnings of commercial society were of central concern to 
its early observers - students of classical political economy. From 
Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence 68 in the early 1760s through the 
French economistes' analyses of agrarian production and property 
law69 to Marx's study of labor regulations, 70 the ambition was not to 
study markets in the abstract, but to uncover the legal foundations of 
commercial society. In this pursuit, these economists were not merely 
observers but advocates of reform of one kind or another. To use a 
limited (and anachronistic) vocabulary, their concerns were inextrica-
bly "normative" and "positive" - in part for the general reason that 
there is never a clean analytic separation between these orientations, 71 
but also because the "economy," which was the object of their study, 
was in the process of active construction. 72 
In that construction, the two markets of overwhelming concern to 
the early theorist-advocates were those in grain and labor. Reforming 
them required eliminating price controls and supply requirements on 
grain - which constituted what has been called the "moral economy" 
in food, whereby the state or local community accepted ultimate re-
sponsibility for its provision73 - and abolishing guild restrictions on 
entry into trades, as well as feudal dues and related obligations in the 
countryside. 74 It was believed that the labor and grain markets were 
68 ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R.L. Meek et al. eds., r978). 
69 See PIERRE-PAUL LE MERCIER DE LA RIVIERE, L'ORDRE NATUREL ET ESSENTIEL 
DES SOCIETES POLITIQUES 67-r r8 (r767) (describing the physiocratic theory of natural law and 
property); see also STEVEN LAURENCE KAPLAN, PROVISIONING PARIS 420-40 (r984) (describ-
ing the relationship between physiocracy and grain policy). 
70 See r KARL MARX, CAPITAL 255-330 (Frederick Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward 
Aveling trans., Charles H. Kerr & Co. r9r2) (r867) (discussing the length of the working day and 
maximum-hours regulations). 
71 HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY 7-45 (2002). 
72 For two seminal accounts of the legal construction of the economy, see MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2008); 
and Karl Polanyi, The Economy as Instituted Process, in TRADE AND MARKET IN THE EARLY 
EMPIRES 243 (Karl Polanyi et al. eds., r957). I pursue this theme in my forthcoming book, 
DAVID SINGH GREWAL, THE INVENTION OF THE ECONOMY (forthcoming 2or5). 
73 See E.P. Thompson, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, 
PAST & PRESENT, Feb. r97r, at 76; and see also his follow-up in E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS 
IN COMMON 259-351 (r99r). For a discussion of the changing regulation of grain in eighteenth-
century France, see KAPLAN, supra note 69. 
74 See JOHN MARKOFF, THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM 554-56 (r996). 
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linked, such that a reorientation in one required, and pushed along re-
ciprocally, a corresponding reorientation in the other. The result of 
this deregulated75 grain-labor market would be, according to its advo-
cates, progress for the poor, productivity in agriculture, the enhance-
ment of the power and wealth of the state (owing to a larger tax base), 
and the dissolution of vestigial feudal relations through the commer-
cialization of labor relations and the free rental or sale of farmland. 76 
At the heart of this argument was the claim that higher grain prices 
would lead to more abundant food and higher wages, ultimately help-
ing the poor. Defenders of the moral economy resisted this conclusion, 
either on the ground that this claim, like many others in the discourse 
of political economy, was paradoxical, or else by arguing that higher 
grain prices might indeed stimulate agricultural production but that 
the increased long-run provision of food would do nothing to alleviate 
the short-term dearth that was the target of government regulation. 77 
The focus of free market advocacy on grain and labor dates to the 
birth of political economy in the work of Pierre de Boisguilbert78 
through Smith's Wealth of Nations, 79 but its prominent impact on Eu-
ropean society continued to be felt in subsequent centuries. Reforming 
markets in grain and labor required reconceptualizing property and 
contract law,80 in addition to developing new state regulations and 
public infrastructures.81 Legal changes along these lines were pursued 
by successive British governments,82 by the French monarchy,83 and 
75 This reorientation to the market is often described as "deregulation," but it actually consti-
tutes a move from one legal-regulatory regime to another, under which private agents have new 
powers of decisionmaking delegated to them (often on the basis of property ownership), along with 
corresponding claims on public enforcement capacity. 
76 See Hont & Ignatieff, supra note rs, at 13-26 (giving an overview of the arguments); see also 
EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS 72-86 (2oor) (explicating the views of Turgot, 
Condorcet, and Smith on these issues). 
77 See Hont& Ignatieff, supra note rs, at r1-r9. 
78 For the work of Pierre de Boisguilbert (perhaps the first theorist of the self-regulating mar-
ket), see 2 PIERRE DE BOISGUILBERT OU LA NAISSANCE DE L'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE (J. 
Hecht ed., r966); and see also GILBERT FACCARELLO, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LAISSEZ-
FAIRE: THE ECONOMICS OF PIERRE DE BOISGUILBERT (r999). 
79 See SMITH, supra note rs, at s24-43; id. at r3S-S9, 469-71 (criticizing the apprenticeship 
system). 
80 See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 9-43 (2oro); see also sources cited 
infra notes 87-89. 
81 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION 3rr-s7 (Michel Senellart 
ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2007) (on eighteenth-century administration and "governmentality"). 
82 For a broad overview, see P.J. Cain, British Capitalism and the State: An Historical Per-
spective, 68 POL. Q. 9S, 9S-98 (r997); and see also DAVID MCNALLY, POLITICAL ECONOMY 
AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 22-66, 2so-S6 (r988). 
83 See MCNALLY, supra note 82, at r48-S r; ROTHSCHILD, supra note 76, at 72-86; JOHN 
SHOVLIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VIRTUE rs2-S4 (2006). 
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later by the French revolutionariess4 (who carried it across Europe in 
the Napoleonic Code),s5 albeit at different tempos and by different 
means. The consequence of these policies was the creation of the 
modern industrial economy, in which urban workers sell their labor in 
competitive markets for wages and then use this money to purchase 
foodstuffs produced by a much smaller number of farmers. The grad-
ual generalization of such wage work in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries made European states (and subsequently their colonies) into 
"capitalist" societies, in which markets and the division of labor are 
central to the distribution of essential goods and services, in contrast to 
earlier societies in which markets played a less central role in the pro-
duction and distribution of basic resources.s6 
This "freeing" of the grain and labor markets was not a simple hy-
draulic process (though it was often depicted as such) in which the 
dead weight of state regulation was removed, allowing a wellspring of 
commercial sociability to bubble up. Rather, this new market regime 
was understood from its inception to be a positive legal construction. 
It required the creation of a new legal order, the drafting of the laws of 
capitalism. At the foundation of these laws was a new conception of 
juridical equality based on freedom of contract and private property in 
which no formal distinctions among parties would be recognized. s7 
Corresponding to this equality before law was the delegation of pro-
ductive activity to private agents linked through markets - that is, to 
agents understood to be acting in their "private" capacity.ss The re-
gime was given public legitimation through new constitutional orders 
84 The extent to which the French revolution was a "bourgeois" revolution within the familiar 
Marxist scheme remains much debated, but the intent of the August Decrees, for example, was 
straightforwardly to abolish feudal forms of property and privilege along with the traditional la-
bor obligations of the peasantry. For a defense of its characterization as bourgeois, see COLIN 
MOOERS, THE MAKING OF BOURGEOIS EUROPE (r99r). For a critical examination of the 
concept of bourgeois state form, see Heide Gerstenberger, The Bourgeois State Form Revisited, in 
r OPEN MARXISM r5r (Werner Bonefeld et al. eds., r992); and for an exploration of this concept 
of the bourgeois state form in German history, without the corresponding idea of the "bourgeois 
revolution," see DAVID BLACKBOURN & GEOFF ELEY, THE PECULIARITIES OF GERMAN 
HISTORY (r984). 
85 On the history of the formulation of the code, see JEAN-LOUIS HALPERIN, L'IMPOSSIBLE 
CODE CIVIL (r992). On the continuing impact of Napoleon's legal reforms on post-Restoration 
Europe, see NAPOLEON'S LEGACY (David Laven & Lucy Riall eds., 2000). 
86 For a classic discussion of capitalism's development, see Polanyi, supra note 72. 
87 See PURDY, supra note So, at 9-43. The shift from status-based inequalities to formal ju-
ridical equality was (and remains) very imperfectly realized, particularly considering formal dis-
crimination against women. It was this imperfect realization of an ostensibly universal equality 
that led Mary Wollstonecraft to demand the "rights of woman" against the gender inequality of 
early bourgeois radicalism. See MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS 
OF WOMAN (r792). 
88 See RAYMOND GEUSS, PUBLIC GOODS, PRIVATE GOODS 75-ro4 (20or); see also Nancy 
Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democ-
racy, Soc. TEXT, no. 25/26, r990, at 56. 
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that ratified formal equality among persons and gave special protec-
tions to the rights of contract and property. 89 
In France and the United States - and then elsewhere - these 
new constitutional orders solved the puzzle of creating a political 
whole out of the legally equal, discrete individuals of commercial soci-
ety by establishing revolutionary frameworks predicated on the dis-
tinction between "sovereignty" and "government."90 In practice, this 
ordering provides for the periodic reaffirmation of the sovereignty of 
the people in the form of direct ratification of fundamental legislation, 
either at the moment of constitutional inauguration or through ongoing 
processes of constitutional amendment, but through a variety of 
countermajoritarian mechanisms, it places limits on the ability of the 
people to radically revise the legal rules underlying commercial socie-
ty. 91 The result is what we might call the "constitution of capitalism," 
understood in a double sense as the constitutional order that most cap-
italist societies have adopted historically and the legal foundation of 
the social processes that constitute the economic system of capitalism. 92 
A detailed study of these legal foundations is essential to under-
standing the institutional structure of capitalism. Here the insights of 
institutional political economy and law and economics may be usefully 
adapted to the task. 93 As Professor Wolfgang Streeck has recently ar-
gued, the institutionalist turn in social science has produced general in-
89 See MARKOFF, supra note 74, at 450-69; SHOVLIN, supra note 83, at r9r-97. For a study 
of the transformation of American labor law, see John Fabian Witt, Rethinking the Nineteenth-
Century Employment Contract, Again, r8 LAW & HIST. REV. 627 (2000). 
90 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, I WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-r7 (r99r) (describing 
what he calls "dualist democracy"); see also THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM (Martin 
Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2008) (presenting a collection of essays on this theme in diverse ju-
risprudential contexts); RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN (forthcoming 2or4) 
(providing an account of the origin of the distinction between government and sovereignty in 
Bodin and its subsequent adaptation by Hobbes, Rousseau, and theorists of the American and 
French revolutionary orders). 
91 See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 97-99, r46-48 (2004). 
92 One route to such a political analysis of capitalism is via an interrogation of the Marxist 
concept of the "bourgeois state," particularly if understood in its legal dimension and without a 
necessary dependence on the classical Marxist theory of revolution. For an account of nineteenth-
century German history along these lines, see BLACKBOURN & ELEY, supra note 84, at r90-2 ro; 
and for a similar ambition with respect to earlier French and British history, see HEIDE 
GERSTENBERGER, IMPERSONAL POWER 662-87 (David Fernbach trans., 2007). Also see more 
generally many of the contributions to OPEN MARXISM, supra note 84, particularly Werner 
Bonefeld, Social Constitution and the Form of the Capitalist State, in r OPEN MARXISM, supra 
note 84, at 93. 
93 By institutional political economy, I mean to indicate a variety of approaches that, as Profes-
sor Charles Maier describes (and then exemplifies), treat "economic ideas and behavior not as 
frameworks for analysis, but as beliefs and actions that must themselves be explained." See 
CHARLES S. MAIER, IN SEARCH OF STABILITY 6 (r987). 
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sights that can, with a few "parametric specifications,"94 be put to use 
in the study of capitalism as a "specific type of social order," under-
girded by distinct legal arrangements. 95 Supplementing Marx's in-
sights about the organization of wage-labor, Streeck suggests a variety 
of other empirical features characterizing capitalism. These include 
the presumed legitimacy of pursuing gain through private contract 
without, for the most part, being constrained by traditionalist "super-
norms,"96 expectations of social solidarity, restraints on competition, or 
elite duties to ensure "system survival";97 the expectation that rule fol-
lowers are "rational-egoistic"98 in their orientation rather than norm 
internalizers with respect to the purpose of a rule (as with, for exam-
ple, financial regulations); 99 and a "differential endowment of classes 
with resources,"100 which results in classes having different capacities 
for effective agency, including disparate ability to mobilize political co-
alitions to advance their interests. 101 
It is not difficult to appreciate how these and other aspects of capi-
talist societies are legally structured and, in turn, how they define the 
landscape of social interactions in which the "fundamental inequality 
of capitalism" holds. 102 Indeed, the mid-twentieth-century reversal of 
r > g emerged from deep changes in the regulation of the market (pp. 
355-56) - changes which led some contemporary observers, such as 
the Labour Party theoretician Anthony Crosland, to wonder whether 
their societies were still capitalist. 103 It remains a live question: were 
the mixed economies of the postwar period still capitalist if what 
Piketty calls the "central contradiction of capitalism" had been over-
come (pp. 135-39)? 
94 Wolfgang Streeck, Taking Capitalism Seriously: Towards an Institutionalist Approach to 
Contemporary Political Economy, 9 Socro-EcoN. REV. 137, 140 (2011) (emphasis omitted). 
95 Id. at 137· Streeck relies on recent scholarship associated with "rational choice institution-
alism," "sociological institutionalism," and "historical institutionalism" to advance this account of 
capitalism, understood as a historically specific "set of interrelated social institutions" and "not as 
a self-driven mechanism of surplus extraction and accumulation." Id. at 138. 
96 Id. at 147 (italics omitted). 
97 Id. at 150 (italics omitted); see also id. at 143, 147-48, 150. 
98 Id. at 143 (italics omitted). 
99 Id. at 143-46. On this point with respect to financial regulations, see Lev Menand, Safe and 
Sound Banking: Using Standards to Combat Excessive Risk-Taking at Large Financial Institu-
tions (Apr. 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
100 Streeck, supra note 94, at 147· 
101 Id. at 14 7-48. 
102 To appreciate fully its legal structuring, we should employ what Professor Nancy Fraser 
calls an "expanded conception" of capitalism, taking into account the interrelation of class, race, 
gender, and other dimensions of inequality. See Nancy Fraser, Behind Marx's Hidden Abode: For 
an Expanded Conception of Capitalism, NEW LEFT REV., Mar.-Apr. 2014, at 55. 
103 See C.A.R. CROSLAND, THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM 56-76 (r956). Crosland's answer 
(describing the Britain of his time) was "no." Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Understanding the movement from patrimonial capitalism to the 
postwar "mixed economy" and back requires a nuanced account of 
what John Commons long ago called the "legal foundations of capital-
ism,"104 and which legal realists from Robert Hale to Karl Llewellyn to 
Jerome Frank put at the center of their analyses. 105 The return to 
Hale-style legal realism in the analysis of public institutions and "pri-
vate" law may help stimulate a "law and economics" approach to the 
study of capitalism, rather than an approach in which markets are 
considered abstractly. 106 Subjects that would be particularly im-
portant to study include the causes and consequences of the post-
feudal reconstitution of property law, 107 and the ways in which labor, 
public benefits, and corporate law together structure the modern labor 
market as an arena of "contested exchange" in which "economic pow-
er" is structured through various contractual mechanisms. 108 These 
104 See JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (r924); see also MAIER, 
supra note 93, at r2 r-2 73 (describing the requirements of economic stability in postwar Europe). 
105 See, e.g., ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW (r952). For an account of Hale's 
relationship to the legal realists, see BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON 
LAISSEZ FAIRE IO-IS (r998); and see also Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Fou-
cault!, 15 Legal Stud. F. 327 (1991); and Steven G. Medema et al., Institutional Law and Econom-
ics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 4r8 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 2000) (on the institutionalist economics behind legal realism). 
106 Studies of default rules and incomplete contracts may prove especially valuable in helping 
us identify the "transaction structure" of capitalism. On the concept of the transaction structure, 
see Alvin K. Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 905 (r985). On default rules and incomplete contracting, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 
(r989); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate 
Coasean Trade, I04 YALE L.J. I027 (r995); and Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the 
Theory of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. rr9 (r988). For a revision of the Calabresian taxonomy 
of legal entitlements, see Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, I06 YALE L.J. 703 (r996). 
107 On post-feudal property regimes and their transformation, see sources cited supra note 87. 
For the importance of the numerus clausus principle in this reconstruction, see Claire Priest, Op-
timal Alienability in the Law of Property and the History of the Numerus Clausus (Mar. 3r, 2or4) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), which responds to Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, r IO 
YALE L.J. r (2000); and Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verifica-
tion: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 3r J. LEGAL STUD. S373 
(2002). The extension of property concepts to the realm of ideas and the globalization of these 
protections in international intellectual property law are also part of this reorientation. See 
SUSANK. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 75-r20 (2003). 
108 On the theory of contested exchange, see Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Contested Ex-
change: Political Economy and Modern Economic Theory, 78 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) r45, r47 (r988); and Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Revenge of Homo Economicus: 
Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter r993, at 83. 
On the conjunction of labor and welfare laws, see Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare Requires from 
Work, 54 UCLA L. REV. 373 (2006); and Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor 
Law in Cities and States, r24 HARV. L. REV. rr53 (2orr); and on the complexities of the Ameri-
can welfare state and its benefits programs, see JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE 
STATE 5-77 (2002). 
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and related inqumes would help us understand the conditions under 
which formal equality of contract is compatible with widening eco-
nomic inequality. We must also consider the way that law structures 
not just the particular bargains in capitalism (most prominently, the 
wage bargain), but also the broader social and political setting of the 
market. Here the dynamics of public and private debt, 109 the regula-
tion of finance in an age of "financialization,"110 the constraints placed 
on democratic control of the economy by international integration, 111 
and the problem of "commodification" understood as the regulation of 
"contested commodities" and "blocked exchanges"112 may prove espe-
cially salient. 
In studying these issues, Piketty's work should lead us to consider 
how the legal foundations of capitalism influence the rate of return on 
capital and its consistent outpacing of overall growth. The ways dif-
ferent areas of the law interact to affect the inequality r > g may be 
considerably complex. For example, Piketty analyzes the demographic 
contribution to the inequality by focusing on the impact of inherited 
wealth, which is more concentrated in low-growth demographic re-
gimes; by contrast, in growing populations, labor is more determina-
tive than inheritance (pp. 83-84). Yet slower demographic growth 
may also lead to increased bargaining power for labor, since the avail-
ability of fewer workers means those present can demand more from 
employers - a dynamic John Stuart Mill emphasized in his social re-
form agenda. 113 The trente glorieuses may have achieved their excep-
tionally high ratio of g to r - and their relatively egalitarian distribu-
109 See Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, NEW LEFT REV., Sept.-Oct. 
2orr, at 5; Wolfgang Streeck, The Politics of Public Debt: Neoliberalism, Capitalist Development 
and the Restructuring of the State, 15 GERMAN ECON. REV. 143 (2014). 
110 See Tamara Lothian, Democracy, Law and Global Finance: A Legal and Institutional Per-
spective, in RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY: JUDGMENT, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE RIGHT TO 
POLITICS (Albena Azmanova & Mihaela Mihai eds., forthcoming 20r5); Robert Hockett & Daniel 
Dillon, Income Inequality and Market Fragility: Some Empirics in the Political Economy of Fi-
nance (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2 204 7 IO (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2014) [http://perma.cc/N7NA-THHX]. On the concept of "financialization," see 
COSTAS LAPAVITSAS, PROFITING WITHOUT PRODUCING r3-43 (2or3). 
111 See ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM 223-40 (2or r). And 
for a political-theoretic examination of the same, see THE ECONOMIC LIMITS TO MODERN 
POLITICS (John Dunn ed., r992). 
112 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (r996). For an overview of 
studies of commodification in law and economics, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability, in 2 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 268 (Peter Newman ed., 
r998); and in moral philosophy, see Judith Andre, Blocked Exchanges: A Taxonomy, I03 ETHICS 
29 (r992); and see also RUSSELL KEAT, CULTURAL GOODS AND THE LIMITS OF THE MAR-
KET r49-71 (2000). For in-depth studies of commodification in media, health, and administra-
tion, see COLIN LEYS, MARKET-DRIVEN POLITICS I08-2IO (2oor); Jon D. Michaels, Privatiza-
tion's Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 7I7 (20IO); and Jon D. Michaels, Privatization's Progeny, 
IOI GEO. L.J. I023 (2or3). 
113 See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 439-52 (r848). 
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tion of growth - at least partly because of relative labor scarcity. 114 
Likewise, the end of the exceptional postwar period coincided with the 
beginning of "globalization," through which multinational companies 
gained the ability to resist wage demands by offshoring or threatening 
to offshore.115 Understanding more fully how demographic change 
contributes to economic inequality thus requires a study of labor law, 
reproductive rights, corporate strategy, and international economic in-
tegration. Inquiries into other determinants of r > g - for example, 
the impact of technological change - will likely prove just as com-
plex, and just as legally structured. 
Alongside this research into the legal foundations of capitalism, 
there remains the work of understanding the institutional structure of 
"democracy," which Piketty presents as the counterpoint to capitalism. 
Many of the current threats to broadly democratic decisionmaking in 
the United States fall within the special province of lawyers, including 
politically motivated redistricting, 116 voter suppression efforts, 117 the 
influence of special lobbies, 118 and the ongoing juridification of a con-
ception of free speech that is oligarchic in effect, if not in intent. 119 
The relation of these challenges to Piketty's narrative of increasing in-
equality - including the growing political power of the superrich - is 
important and underexplored. 120 More generally, it remains unclear 
how well the "rule of law" will cope with radically widening socioeco-
nomic inequality. Here both historical and comparative legal analysis 
114 We must remember that not only Europe but also the United States experienced rising 
growth and moderation of inequality in the postwar period (pp. 96-97), even though it was al-
ready at the "technological frontier" - and thus these trends cannot be credited to "catch-up" and 
reconstruction (p. 397). See also id. at 397 (discussing "Reconstruction capitalism" (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). 
115 The credible threat of offshoring may reduce the bargaining power of workers and thus 
their income (where wages include inframarginal rents), even without any factory relocations. See 
Arindrajit Dube & Sanjay G. Reddy, Threat Effects and Trade: Wage Discipline through Product 
Market Competition, 4 J. GLOBALIZATION & DEV. 2r3 (2or3). 
116 For a critical overview and proposal, see Heather Gerken, Getting from Here to There in 
Redistricting Reform, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y r (2oro). 
117 The effort to overcome local voter suppression efforts will be made more difficult by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County v. Holder, r33 S. Ct. 26r2 (2or3), in which the Court 
struck down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of r964. 
118 On which, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST (2orr); and Heather Gerken, Lobby-
ing as the New Campaign Finance, 2 7 GA. ST. U. L. REV. r r55 (2or r). 
l19 See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, r34 S. Ct. r434 (2or4); Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett, r3r S. Ct. 2806 (2orr); Citizens United v. FEC, r30 S. Ct. 876 (2oro); FEC 
v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 55r U.S. 449 (2007). On the nature of commercial speech in current 
Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence, see Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism, 77 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2or4); and see also ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DI-
VIDED 59-66 (2or4), which discusses the conflicting conceptions of democratic legitimacy in the 
decision. 
120 For an important contribution, see Gilens & Page, supra note 32. 
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may help illuminate an intensifying dimension of capitalism in the 
twenty-first century. 121 
v. WHAT Is To BE DONE? 
What is to be done? In Part Four of Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century, Piketty introduces a set of policy proposals for redressing the 
growing inequalities he catalogs. He discusses the difficulties currently 
facing national social welfare and tax programs and advocates a global 
wealth tax and deeper European integration (pp. 471-92, 515-30, 556-
62). Most serious criticisms of the book have rightly focused on the 
limitations of these proposals. But these limitations are not Piketty's 
alone: they reflect broader failures of intellectual imagination and pro-
grammatic ambition in economic policymaking. Furthermore, while 
Piketty's numbers invite a welcome debate on inequality, they do not, 
of course, tell us how to regard that inequality, let alone how to 
remedy it. 
However, we can perhaps glean an orientation, if not a policy pro-
gram, from the trends he identifies. Most important, we must recog-
nize that his major conclusion exceptionalizes the trente glorieuses. 
Once that period of unusually high growth in the advanced world is 
denormalized, a different set of questions emerges about the structure 
of the economy and its relation to political agency. Should the unequal 
distribution of wealth and income be redressed, and if so, how? Is 
capitalism sustainable, and under which political conditions? Are cap-
italism and democracy complementary or antagonistic, and under 
what circumstances? These and related questions preoccupied late-
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century observers of capitalism before 
giving way during the postwar interlude when what Professor Charles 
Maier calls the "politics of productivity" mitigated distributive conflict 
and generated broad, if temporary, consensus about economic policy. 122 
Now, as capitalism resumes its longer-running pattern, these questions 
may be resurrected. 123 
In considering these questions, Piketty's empirical assessments need 
to be situated within a broader structural account of the dynamics of 
capitalism, as I suggest above in describing capitalism as a legal order-
ing. However, apart from the occasional aside, Piketty remains silent 
121 For a criticism of the conflation of the "rule of law" with private property protections, see 
JEREMY WALDRON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE MEASURE OF PROPERTY (2012). For 
analyses of how neoliberalism is reconfiguring particular areas of law, see Symposium, Law and 
Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2014). 
122 See MAIER, supra note 93, at 121; see also id. at 121-84. 
123 See David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the return of questions from the early centu-
ry that were considered settled by legal academics during the postwar period). 
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on numerous important debates about the structural features of capi-
talist economies. Not so the late Oxford economist Professor Andrew 
Glyn, who produced probably the most comprehensive Marxist analysis 
of late-twentieth-century capitalism. 124 Glyn's last book, Capitalism Un-
leashed, draws on much of the same data as Piketty's - including 
Piketty's earlier work and that of Professor Angus Maddison - as 
well as a range of other indicators such as measures of manufacturing 
profits, government expenditure, and labor market strife. 125 Glyn used 
these data to construct a detailed historical account of the role of class 
conflict in the history of postwar capitalism, as well as a set of policy 
proposals following on that account. Those stimulated by Piketty's 
analysis should turn to Glyn for a compatible but more fully elaborat-
ed depiction of distributional conflict and its consequences in postwar 
capitalist society. 
Similarly, Streeck has recently produced a series of studies on the 
crises of democratic capitalism, focused especially on the role of public 
and private debt in achieving an accommodation between market im-
peratives and democratic demands. 126 Like Piketty, Streeck recognizes 
the exceptionalism of the trente glorieuses, but he regards the years 
since the 1970s as less a return to a "normal" form of capitalism than 
an attempt to return to an earlier form conducted under conditions of 
broadly distributed political power and aspiration. The social conflicts 
generated by a resurgent inequality reminiscent of the Gilded Age in 
the context of a post-Gilded Age mass politics have generated bur-
geoning levels of public and private debt, which, according to Streeck, 
only the 2008 financial crisis fully revealed. 
Combining Glyn and Streeck with Piketty helps us to identify 
where the fault lines of future political contests will lie: in broad fights 
over debt, taxation, and public spending as the fiftieth through nineti-
eth percentiles in the income and wealth tables lose ground to the top 
ro%, and in more specific conflicts as professionals and small busi-
nesspeople in the top ro% lose ground to the r% and yet smaller frac-
tions. They also suggest that these problems ultimately emerge from 
differential power - the ability of some groups rather than others to 
control the state. Finally, these analyses help clarify that what is ex-
124 See ANDREW GLYN, CAPITALISM UNLEASHED (2006) [hereinafter GLYN, CAPITALISM 
UNLEASHED]; see also PHILIP ARMSTRONG ET AL., CAPITALISM SINCE r945 (r99r); SOCIAL 
DEMOCRACY IN NEOLIBERAL TIMES (Andrew Glyn ed., 20or) (discussing welfare states since 
the r98os). 
125 GLYN, CAPITALISM UNLEASHED, supra note r24. Glyn's early death meant that he was un-
able to update his analysis in light of the financial crisis of 2008. 
126 See sources cited supra note rag; see also POLITICS IN THE AGE OF AUSTERITY (Armin 
Schafer & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2or3). 
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ceptional about the trente glorieuses must be understood m a political 
dimension. 
Unfortunately, Piketty engages with neither Glyn nor Streeck, 
though they would have proven useful interlocutors. Both, for exam-
ple, are skeptical of the democratic potential of the European Un-
ion,127 in contrast to Piketty, who advocates for European political uni-
fication to complement its monetary and economic integration (pp. 
558-60). 128 This is not the occasion to rehearse that debate in detail, 
but many leftists have long argued that European integration, especial-
ly in its monetary dimension, would serve to undermine social democ-
racy in member states rather than to extend it. 129 Lately, this view has 
even gained support among former architects of monetary union, such 
as Oskar Lafontaine. 130 
Piketty's consciousness of the difficulty of enacting any national 
project of social democracy, given international economic integration 
and the mobility of transnational capital, makes him understandably 
eager to seek solutions at the same transnational scale (pp. 558-62, 
127 See Andrew Glyn, Egalitarianism in a Global Economy, Bos. REV., Dec.-Jan. 1997-1998, 
at 4; Wolfgang Streeck, Markets and Peoples: Democratic Capitalism and European Integration, 
NEW LEFT REV., Jan.-Feb. 2012, at 63. 
128 Piketty's support for deeper European integration reflects tbe influence of Pierre Rosanvallon, a 
theorist of post-national or cosmopolitan democratic forms, with whom he has collaborated in politi-
cal advocacy. See PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRACY PAST AND FUTURE 189-234 (Samuel 
Moyn ed., 2006) (describing the changing nature of democratic politics and arguing that European 
integration reveals the character of post-national democracy). Piketty and Rosanvallon have re-
cently collaborated in advocacy for European political unification. See Thomas Piketty & Pierre 
Rosanvallon, Manifeste pour une union politique de l'euro, LE MONDE (Feb. 17, 2014, 11:53 
AM), http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/02/16/manifeste-pour-une-union-politique-de-l-euro 
_4366865_J232.html [http://perma.cc/Y8NE-7AET]. More generally, while Piketty understands 
himself as having come into political consciousness after 1989 (p. 3 1), he is arguably heir to Mit-
terrand's modernization of the Parti Socialiste following the economic crisis of 1983, which 
turned the French left increasingly away from its focus on social justice and economic equality 
toward market integration in an expressly post-socialist "social Europe." On Piketty's analysis, 
France entered the stage of increasing inequality starting in 1983, with the defeat of this program, 
from which he takes the lesson that the success of social democracy now depends on European 
integration. See PIKETTY, supra note 8, at r38-39 (describing France's trajectory); id. at 289-90 
(describing the early years of Mitterrand's first presidency); id. at 56r-62 (evaluating European 
unification). So far, at least, the turn to economic integration has apparently cemented this trend, 
rather than reverse it, as Piketty's own analysis shows. For further discussion of this shift in 
French policy, see sources cited supra note 2 r. 
129 See George Ross, European Center-Lefts and the Mazes of European Integration, in 
WHAT'S LEFT OF THE LEFT, supra note 2r, at 3r9 (providing an overview of left responses to 
European monetary integration). 
130 On his shift, see Oskar Lafontaine, Plddoyer fur ein neues Wdhrungssystem, 
HANDELSBLATT (May 23, 2or3, 6:43 AM), http://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/gastbeitraege 
/gastkommen tar-plaedoyer-fuer-ein-neues-waehrungssystem/82 406 38.html [http://perma.cc/G W 3 K 
-9FXSJ; and for the report that influenced it, see HEINER FLASSBECK & COSTAS LAPAVITSAS, 
ROSA LUXEMBURG STIFTUNG, THE SYSTEMIC CRISIS OF THE EURO - TRUE CAUSES 
AND EFFECTIVE THERAPIES 5 (2or3), http://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs 
/Studien/Studien_ The_systemic_crisis_ web. pdf [h ttp://perma.cc/MWU 7-JWLS]. 
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573). But it seems hard to accept that an aggressive global tax on cap-
ital or a political union of the European states is politically feasible, 
while a return at the national level to Keynesian-style macroeconomic 
planning with strong labor protections is not. The relative volume of 
cross-border flows is not, after all, incomparably greater than it was in 
the early twentieth century; 131 indeed, the mid-century international 
order of "embedded liberalism" was constructed as a deliberate policy 
response to the highly globalized world of the early century and the 
chaos and war into which it descended. 132 Piketty may be assuming 
that elites are now better coordinated across countries and thus more 
capable of enacting transnational policy. 133 But even if this is true, an 
elite-driven response threatens to replicate the "democratic deficit" that 
has plagued most existing projects of transnational coordination, 134 
and it sets up the risk - which Piketty admits (p. 5 7 3) - that these 
forms of coordination will exacerbate rather than ameliorate the ine-
quality r > g. 
Recognizing this risk, we should distinguish "democracy-
enhancing" and "democracy-inhibiting" forms of international integra-
tion 135 and note that it is possible to aim for the former but end up 
with the latter, as the postwar history of Europe arguably reveals. By 
engineering the early merger of economic elites, from the Coal and 
Steel Union through to the Euro, those in favor of greater European 
integration correctly assumed that shared economic interests and re-
peated structural crises would prompt calls for political unification. 136 
However, this strategy offered no guarantee of a democratic political 
response by newly integrated elites, and it has so far delivered only the 
liberal managerialism that many others predicted. 
Relatedly, Piketty's proposal for a global wealth tax assumes a co-
ordinated, top-down, data-driven, and retrospective response to the in-
equalities that capitalism generates - and in this he globalizes the fa-
miliar presumption of many economists that taxation ex post is a 
better way to address inequality than ex ante changes to the legal rules 
131 See GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 65-r88 (Michael D. Bordo et al. 
eds., 2003). 
132 See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Lib-
eralism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379 (r982). 
133 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (describing transnational 
governmental networks). 
134 For a critical account, see Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations Be Democratic? 
A Skeptic's View, in DEMOCRACY'S EDGES r9 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 
r999); and for a "pragmatic" response, see Andrew Moravcsik, Is There a 'Democratic Deficit' in 
World Politics? A Framework for Analysis, 39 Gov'T & OPPOSITION 336 (2004). 
135 Robert 0. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT'L ORG. r, 2, 27 
(2009). 
136 See JEAN MONNET, MEMOIRS 4r7 (Richard Mayne trans., r978). 
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governing the economy. 137 On that view, it is more efficient to allow 
the unencumbered market to generate wealth - which can later be 
redistributed - than to attempt to alter the organization of the market 
in the first place. But the question as to whether ex ante or ex post 
mechanisms are more efficient assumes that both are politically feasi-
ble - and it may be naive to assume that after letting the inequality-
producing market run its course there will be any agent left at the end 
of the process capable of demanding redistribution. Indeed, on a more 
path-dependent conception of political action, it may be only through 
structural changes to the economy - which galvanize political coali-
tions while resurrecting distributive questions - that an electorate be-
comes capable of demanding higher tax rates. It was mass political 
empowerment at the height of the labor movement, drawing on post-
war solidarity, that achieved the high marginal tax rates of the mid-
century as part of a broader redesign of the terms of economic cooper-
ation. If Piketty's proposal for a global capital tax is, in his own 
words, "utopian" (p. 515), it is because it presumes a political agent ca-
pable of enacting it, which is neither present now nor likely to be gen-
erated by the trends he identifies. 
Further, Piketty's policy proposals mainly borrow models devel-
oped by mid-century social democracies - high marginal tax rates, in-
ternational coordination, and so on - and attempt to deepen or extend 
them. Yet his findings suggest that this period was exceptional. If 
contemporary capitalism increasingly resembles the period before the 
exceptional times began, we should perhaps draw on the correspond-
ing array of political strategies: general strikes and labor activism, ex-
periments with new forms of cooperative industrial organization, and 
radical political and social movements. Even if Piketty is right that 
we must now globalize any national response to transnational capital-
ism, it remains unclear that we can - or should - rely upon the poli-
cy repertoire of the trente glorieuses. 
What, then, is to be done? It remains unclear what should or can 
be done about inequality absent a normative assessment of the kind 
proposed above in Part III and a legal-institutional analysis as sug-
gested in Part IV. But if we look back at the answers to this question 
when capitalism was last in its Gilded Age, we find a debate on the 
left between Vladimir Lenin and Eduard Bernstein concerning revolu-
tionary tactics as against parliamentary socialism, set in a broader dis-
cussion of the structural relation of localized economic contests (of 
137 See, e.g., Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should Affect 
Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design, Sr SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 264 (r979); Louis Kaplow 
& Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing 
Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (r994). 
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workers against capitalists) to working-class political consciousness. 138 
Owing to a pessimistic assessment of the capacity of even highly orga-
nized workers to achieve fundamental reforms within bourgeois de-
mocracy, Lenin formulated a famous (and fateful) argument for a 
vanguardist party that would lead the revolution from above. But in 
the end, neither a disciplined Leninist vanguard nor its alternative, the 
alliance of mobilized workers and socialist politicians of the German 
Social Democratic Party, achieved an enduring democratic reversal of 
the inequality r > g, except in the exceptional postwar period. What, 
then, can we expect from today's unhappy alliance between the rem-
nants of the old workers' parties of Western Europe and the 
Bundesbank ?139 
Perhaps the most plausible strategy at present looks to a politics of 
generational mobilization organized among the children and grand-
children of the "patrimonial middle class," which accumulated modest 
wealth in the twentieth century and enjoyed stable employment and 
reasonable security (pp. 346-4 7 ). Something of this is already visible 
in protests for debt-forgiveness and public goods, focused on educa-
tional opportunity and health care (either arguing for its public provi-
sion or resisting its tacit privatization). More ambitious proposals at-
tempt to universalize the conditions of a secure middle class through 
guaranteed basic income 140 or the redistribution of capital to the young 
in the form of "stakeholding,"141 often with the explicit suggestion that 
this redistribution should be paid for through a tax on elite wealth. 
But consider again Piketty's summary of the distribution of capital 
ownership across most developed economies: what has occurred since 
the 1970s, to varying degrees, is a shift of approximately 5% of nation-
al wealth from the fiftieth through ninetieth percentiles up into the top 
decile, much of it into the top percentile (pp. 248, 348-49). It seems 
doubtful that the children of the twentieth century's "patrimonial mid-
dle class," whose parents were unable or unwilling to alter this upward 
redistribution during decades of comparatively greater empowerment, 
will now be able to reverse the trend for themselves - let alone forge 
138 Compare V.I. LENIN, WHAT Is TO BE DONE? (r902), reprinted in 5 LENIN: COLLECTED 
WORKS 347, 352-73 (Victor Jerome ed., Joe Fineberg & George Hanna trans., Foreign Languages 
Publ'g House r96r), with EDUARD BERNSTEIN, THE PRECONDITIONS OF SOCIALISM (Henry 
Tudor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press r993) (r899). 
139 More abstractly, what social base is now capable of supporting a transnational network to 
constrain capital, especially if we lack the faith that an "objective" class position is sufficient to 
generate a politics of social transformation? For an excellent history of the varieties of socialist 
politics in twentieth-century Western Europe (and the left's responses to this problem), see 
DONALD SASSOON, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOCIALISM (r996). 
140 For a presentation of the basic income scheme proposed by Professor Philippe Van Parijs, 
along with commentaries on it by a range of academics and commentators, see PHILIPPE VAN 
PARIJS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH A FREE LUNCH? (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2oor). 
141 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (r999). 
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a new social contract based on stakeholding or a basic income for all 
citizens. It is true that these children stand to lose even more than 
their parents, but the bet that immiseration will spur effective political 
action has never been a sound one. 
The failure of the financial crisis of 2008 to produce any lasting 
movement for fundamental economic reform may seem to confirm 
Professor Perry Anderson's pessimistic assessment over a decade ago 
that "[t]he only starting-point for a realistic Left today is a lucid regis-
tration of historical defeat."142 Piketty himself is pessimistic, as he has 
recently admitted. 143 To this pessimism of the intellect, however, we 
should muster an optimism of the will. More than Lenin or Bernstein, 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century brings Antonio Gramsci to mind. 
Whatever the limits of his particular proposals, Piketty has fired a 
forceful shot in what Gramsci described as the "war of position," the 
slow but vital work of consciousness-raising that must precede the 
"war of manoeuvre,"144 or "movement,"145 during which distributional 
claims are asserted directly in political contests. There are times when 
a clear-eyed account is the most radical act possible, and even those 
who doubt Piketty's remedies should welcome the clarity of his as-
sessment. In the final analysis, what his book shows (despite its title) 
is that the history of capitalism in the twenty-first century remains to 
be written - and that politics, rather than the natural operation of the 
market, will finish the story. As Piketty concludes: "If democracy is 
someday to regain control of capitalism, it must start by recognizing 
that the concrete institutions in which democracy and capitalism are 
embodied need to be reinvented again and again" (p. 570). 
142 Perry Anderson, Renewals, NEW LEFT REV., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 5, 16. 
143 Thomas Piketty, Dynamics of Inequality, NEW LEFT REV., Jan.-Feb. 2014, at 103, 116. 
144 ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO 
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